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COMMENT
CASTLE IN THE CLOUD:
MODERNIZING CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS FOR CLOUD-STORED
DATA ON MOBILE DEVICES

MARK WILSON*
For if we are observed in all matters, we are constantly under
threat of correction, judgment, criticism, even plagiarism of our own
uniqueness.
We become children, fettered under watchful eyes,
constantly fearful that—either now or in the uncertain future—patterns
we leave behind will be brought back to implicate us, by whatever
authority has now become focused upon our once-private and innocent
acts. We lose our individuality, because everything we do is observable
and recordable. 1

INTRODUCTION
Eighty-five years ago, Justice Louis Brandeis described “the right to
be let alone” as “the right most valued by civilized men.” 2 That right is
now under attack, and people themselves—all of us—are the attackers.

* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law; B.A. 2005, Miami
University (Ohio). I wish to thank my advisors for this Comment, Professors Laura Cisneros and
Robert Calhoun of Golden Gate University School of Law, as well as everyone around me who has
graciously endured my talking about this issue for the past few years.
1
Bruce Schneier, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED (May 18, 2006), www.wired.com/
politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/05/70886.
2
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit announced the death of the Fourth Amendment, blaming
technology for its demise: “Our weapon of choice? Most recently, the
smartphone, which, with our collective blessing, allows law enforcement
to monitor our real-time geographic location.” 3 As Judge Kozinski sees
it, we have surrendered a disproportionate amount of privacy for a little
convenience. 4
Though the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches of
“persons, houses, papers, and effects,” 5 its author, James Madison, could
never have contemplated that a search of a person could simultaneously
encompass effects located in another state. The rise of smart phones—
cell phones with persistent Internet connections 6 —has injured the Fourth
Amendment, but Judge Kozinski’s eulogy may be premature.
Among the new technologies with the potential to adversely impact
privacy is cloud computing. In a cloud computing environment, a user’s
documents are stored on a remote computer system operated and
controlled by a third party. 7 Two popular cloud computing applications,
Apple’s iCloud and Dropbox (from the company of the same name),
market their software by pointing out the convenience they afford. 8
Apple boasts that its iCloud service synchronizes a variety of data,
including documents and web browser history, to all of a user’s devices
with minimum setup. 9 Dropbox advertises that “[a]ny file you save to
Dropbox also instantly saves to your computers, phones, and the
Dropbox website.” 10 Cloud computing is not merely a niche technology
either: millions of people use Dropbox today. 11
Convenient as this synchronization may be, it raises disturbing
Fourth Amendment issues. It also raises confusing statutory issues under
3

Alex Kozinski & Stephanie Grace, Pulling Plug on Privacy: How Technology Helped
Make the Fourth Amendment Obsolete, THE DAILY (June 22, 2011), www.thedaily.com/page/
2011/06/22/062211-opinions-oped-privacy-kozinski-grace-1-2/.
4
Id.
5
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6
A “smart phone” does not have a standardized definition, but it appears accepted in the
field that a smart phone “combines the functions of a cellular phone and a handheld computer in a
single device.” Michael Juntao Yuan, What Is a Smartphone, O’REILLY WIRELESS DEVCENTER,
www.oreillynet.com/wireless/2005/08/23/whatissmartphone.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2012).
7
ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 05/2012 ON CLOUD
COMPUTING, WP 196, at 5 (July 1, 2012), available at ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp196_en.pdf.
8
DROPBOX, TOUR, www.dropbox.com/tour/0 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
9
APPLE, ICLOUD FEATURES, www.apple.com/icloud/features/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
10
DROPBOX, FEATURES, www.dropbox.com/features (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
11
In January 2010, Dropbox announced that 4 million people used its service. See Robin
Wauters, Dropbox Announces 4 Million Users, Hires a VP from Salesforce, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 20,
2010), techcrunch.com/2010/01/20/dropbox-4-million-user/.
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a federal statute known informally as the Stored Communications Act
(SCA). 12 Enacted as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), 13 SCA created a separate standard for obtaining a search
warrant when the “effects” to be searched are electronic communications
transmitted to, and stored with, a “remote computing service.” 14
In 1986, when digital information still resided in large data centers,
the Fourth Amendment problem was limited, as the data stored in data
centers were not readily transportable. 15 Today, however, “essentially
unlimited” online storage 16 allows users not only to store copious
amounts of data, but also to access those data from multiple places,
including a mobile phone. 17 As some courts have held that police may
search the contents of a cellular phone incident to a lawful arrest, 18 the
question becomes how deep into a phone’s data the police can go, and
whether that search is limited to information stored on the phone or
information that is accessible by the phone.
Arguably, information accessible by a mobile device but stored on a
third-party server is an “electronic communication” within the meaning
of the SCA. 19 To a police officer trying to search a mobile device
incident to an arrest, this presents a problem; cloud-stored information
might be protected by the Fourth Amendment, but if it is not, the
information may fall within the ambit of the SCA. If the former, then
absent an exception to the warrant requirement, police must obtain a
warrant to search cloud-stored documents accessible by a phone. If the
latter, then more complex calculations become necessary. If the data
were in storage for less than 180 days, a warrant supported by probable
cause may be required. 20 But if the data were stored for more than 180
days, a warrant is optional because police can obtain an administrative

12

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 tit. II, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848, 1860 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2710 (Westlaw 2012)).
13
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848.
14
18 U.S.C.A. § 2711(2) (Westlaw 2012).
15
ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1718 (statement of Richard Salgado, Senior Counsel, Law Enforcement and Information Security,
Google, Inc.), available at judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-149_58409.pdf.
16
Id. at 24 (statement of Mike Hintze, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation).
17
Id. at 10 (statement of Edward W. Felten, Director, Center for Information and
Technology Policy, Princeton University).
18
See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011).
19
Such communication is defined as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds,
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C.A. §
2510(12) (Westlaw 2012); see also id. § 2510(14), (17).
20
18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a) (Westlaw 2012).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4

264

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

subpoena, which can be issued based on something less than probable
cause. 21 Or the information may not be protected at all.
If the SCA does not govern a search incident to arrest, current law
requires complex calculations that could result in the exclusion of
evidence if police are too liberal when searching, or the potential loss of
evidence if they are too conservative. The exclusionary rule, designed
by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, and made applicable to
the states in Mapp v. Ohio, is a Fourth Amendment enforcement
mechanism. 22 The remedy for evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment is to bar the prosecutor from using that evidence
against the accused. 23 Equally compelling is the prosecution’s interest in
preventing a suspect from destroying evidence on his person or nearby,
leading to the search-incident-to-arrest 24 and automobile-search 25
doctrines. 26 While the law is clear that police may search a suspect’s
person incident to arrest, including any containers located thereon, 27 the
law is unclear as to whether a cell phone is just another container or a
different beast with a separate set of search rules. 28 The end result of this
needlessly complex flowchart will be a rise in motions to exclude
evidence at criminal trials. Police on the beat must be able to make
evidentiary decisions at a moment’s notice. 29 This leads to disparate
enforcement of the law.

21

Id.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“In sum, the rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”).
23
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (“If letters and private documents can
thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection
of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no
value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.”); see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961).
24
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
25
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343-44 (2009).
26
See id. at 339 (describing the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine as “protecting arresting
officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or
destroy”).
27
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1973).
28
See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505-06 (Cal. 2011) (holding that a cell phone is
searchable like any other container on suspect’s person); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio
2009) (holding that a cell phone is not akin to containers from prior case law and could not be
searched without a warrant); Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886, 891-92 (Ga. 2010) (holding that,
even though a cell phone is like a container, that characterization allows police to search some, but
not all, of the files on the device).
29
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“A police officer’s determination as to how and where to
search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which
the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each
step in the search.”).
22
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This Comment argues that the current state of Fourth Amendment
law vis-à-vis searching cloud-stored documents on a mobile device is
untenable. 30 Part I of this Comment defines cloud storage and cloud
computing, and it provides background information on the SCA. Part II
discusses the intricacies of applying the SCA to computers and email,
which is to date the best analog for applying the SCA to cloud
computing. Part III details the legislative and judicial solutions to the
problems raised by new technology and concludes that, while new
legislation is the most desirable response, in the meantime courts must
rethink their notions of what it means to search a mobile device. If either
the legislature or the judiciary can reform a troubled Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence as it relates to new technology, hope remains that reports
of the Fourth Amendment’s death have been greatly exaggerated.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment does not require the government to obtain a
warrant in all situations; only otherwise “unreasonable searches and
seizures” require a warrant issued “upon probable cause.” 31 The United
States Supreme Court addressed the question of what constituted an
unreasonable search in the 1928 case Olmstead v. United States. 32 Roy
Olmstead was accused of leading a conspiracy to import liquor into the
United States during Prohibition. 33 Federal prohibition officers had
intercepted Olmstead’s telephone conversations by tapping into the
telephone wires outside his office. 34 This was accomplished without
trespassing onto Olmstead’s property. 35 In upholding Olmstead’s
conviction, the Supreme Court found it dispositive that the government
listened to his phone conversations “without trespass upon any property

30

What this Comment will not do is discuss privacy expectations relating to social media
applications (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) that may be accessible by a mobile device. In addition to
being beyond the scope of a discussion of cloud-stored communications, it is highly likely that
information posted to Facebook or Twitter carries with it no privacy expectation, as the user has
intentionally placed the information on the Internet for all to see. See, e.g., Bruce Clayton Newell,
Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Online Social Networks, 17 RICH. J. L. & TECH.
12 (2011); Connie Davis Powell, “You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get over It!” Would Warren
and Brandeis Argue for Privacy for Social Networking?, 31 PACE L. REV. 146 (2011).
31
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
32
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
33
Id. at 456.
34
Id. at 456-57.
35
Id. at 457.
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of the defendants,” 36 emphasizing that the government violated the
Fourth Amendment only if it interfered with the suspect’s property. 37
In 1967’s landmark Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court
reversed Olmstead when it held that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.” 38 Federal agents, believing that Charles Katz was
illegally transferring wagering information over the phone, attached an
electronic listening device to the outside of the phone booth in which
Katz made the illegal calls. 39 Agents never interfered with the inside of
the phone booth. 40 However, for the Katz Court, the relevant inquiry
was not whether Charles Katz had a property interest in the phone booth
(or, even if he did, whether federal agents had to “trespass” into the
phone booth to listen to the conversation), but rather whether a person
who “occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the
toll” is “entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece
will not be broadcast to the world.” 41
Justice John Marshall Harlan II, concurring in the judgment, took
this new doctrine even further, articulating the familiar two-pronged test
that remains the standard for determining when the government has
engaged in a Fourth Amendment search: 42 “first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” 43 As technology has advanced, the Court has relied on
this test in determining, for example, whether warrantless searches using
pen registers, 44 heat-detection devices, 45 and aerial surveillance 46 violate
the Fourth Amendment.

36

Id.
Id. at 466 (“Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought
to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a defendant, unless
there has been an official search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his
tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of
making a seizure.”).
38
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
39
Id. at 348.
40
Id. at 352.
41
Id.
42
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979) (“In determining whether a particular
form of government-initiated electronic surveillance is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, our lodestar is Katz v. United States.” (footnote and citation omitted)); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001).
43
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
44
Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
45
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35.
46
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
37
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DEFINING THE CLOUD

“The Cloud” is the popular name for any Internet-based location
where data are stored. 47 “Cloud computing is a model for enabling
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction.” 48 Beyond merely
providing storage, “cloud computing” can also refer to distributing
processing tasks among many computing resources and then delivering
the output to a client computer over a network. 49 The network used to
connect the elements of the Cloud can be private (used by a single
organization), community (used by a set of specific individuals), public
(usable by the general public), or a hybrid of the three. 50 The Cloud
discussed throughout this Comment is a public cloud consisting of the
public Internet and a secure connection to a cloud storage service used by
a subscriber of the cloud-storage service. 51
Cloud computing operates using a client-server architecture, where
the server is a computer that stores and retrieves data, and a client—a
computer or other device—requests data. 52 A cloud computing “server”
actually consists of dozens or hundreds of computer servers arranged in a
huge cluster. 53 This cluster of servers not only stores the data that clients
access, but also contains applications that manage the data. 54 The cloud
computing service maintains a copy of a user’s files on the user’s device
(e.g., computer, smart phone, tablet) and the cloud application

47

Walter S. Mossberg, Learning About Everything Under the “Cloud,” WALL ST. J., May 6,
2010, available at online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703961104575226194192477512.
html.
48
LEE BADGER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., CLOUD COMPUTING SYNOPSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2-1 (May 2012), available at csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800146/sp800-146.pdf.
49
Ian Foster et al., Cloud Computing and Grid Computing 360-Degree Compared, IEEE
Grid Computing Environments (2008), available at arxiv.org/pdf/0901.0131.pdf. For the purposes
of this Comment, “cloud computing” will be limited to its storage implications.
50
BADGER ET AL., supra note 48, at 2-2.
51
Even though companies such as Dropbox or Google store data on their own servers, these
networks are not considered “private,” as the services are available to the general public. See PETER
MELL ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 3
(Sept. 2011), available at csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf.
52
Jonathan
Strickland, How
Cloud
Computing
Works,
HOWSTUFFWORKS,
computer.howstuffworks.com/cloud-computing/cloud-computing.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
53
Id.
54
Id.
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synchronizes these copies with the copies stored on the remote server
whenever the files change. 55
Cloud storage utilizes the storage capacity of off-site servers instead
of the storage provided by the internal disks in a computer. 56 Mobile
devices, and even some smaller laptop computers, have limited storage
capacity due to their small size and their necessarily small internal
disks. 57 Unlike a traditional computer, which stores its data on an
internal hard drive, a mobile device like an iPhone often stores its data on
a third-party server, accessing the data as necessary. 58 Thus, as noncomputer mobile devices have become more popular, use of cloudstorage services has increased as a necessity. 59
Users choose to store their information in the Cloud, and not on
their computers, for a variety of reasons. Information may be stored in
the Cloud as a backup, in case the user’s computer is lost or damaged,
making the information stored on the computer unrecoverable. 60
Businesses increasingly find cloud computing to be a cheap alternative to
hosting large amounts of data and the requisite backup and retrieval
hardware on-site. 61 But even beyond the Cloud’s business solutions—
disaster recovery and saving money—users of all types find it convenient
to access cloud-stored information wherever they have an Internet
connection. 62
Cloud-stored information is typically encrypted, meaning it cannot
be accessed without the password of the person who owns the
information. 63 This does not mean, however, that the information can
never be accessed by anyone but the owner. The Terms of Service
(TOS) for Dropbox, one of the most popular file-storage services,
explicitly state that its employees may “disclose to parties outside

55

For a description of how several cloud-computing services work, see generally Roger
Spoor & Arjan Peddemors, Cloud Storage and Peer-to-Peer Storage: End-User Considerations and
Product Overview, SURFNET (2010), available at www6.surfnet.nl/nl/Innovatieprogramma’s/
gigaport3/Documents/EDS-3R%20Cloud%20and%20p2p%20storage-v1.1.pdf.
56
Mossberg, supra note 47.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Allan Hoffman, Dropbox More Than a Convenience: Cloud Storage Service a Sign of the
Times, THE STAR-LEDGER (Mar. 9, 2012), available at www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2012/03/
dropbox_more_than_a_convenienc.html.
60
Why Is Online Storage Becoming So Popular?, ONLINESTORAGE.ORG, www.online
storage.org/why-is-online-storage-becoming-so-popular/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
61
Id.
62
Online Storage vs. External Hard Drives, ONLINESTORAGE.ORG, www.onlinestorage.
org/online-storage-vs-external-hard-drives/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
63
See, e.g., DROPBOX, HOW SECURE IS DROPBOX?, www.dropbox.com/help/27 (last visited
Feb. 24, 2012).
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Dropbox files stored in your Dropbox” for several reasons, one of which
is to “comply with a law, regulation or compulsory legal request.” 64
Apple’s TOS for its iCloud service are substantially similar. 65
B.

THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT

Integral to any examination of searches of electronically stored
material is the Stored Communications Act of 1986 (SCA). 66 SCA was
passed as part of an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which established the authority for
federal wiretaps. 67 Congress passed the SCA as primitive forms of
electronic communication became prevalent, fearing that a person who
handed computer information to a third party “may be subject to no
constitutional privacy protection.” 68 The SCA contains a strange
idiosyncrasy, however: data that have been in electronic storage for less
than 180 days can be obtained only with a warrant issued using either the
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or a
state’s warrant procedures. 69 Information that has been in storage for
longer than 180 days, however, can be obtained using a federal or state
administrative subpoena or a court order. 70
In order to obtain
electronically stored data under a court order, a state or federal
governmental authority must show “specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of
a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 71
The reason for this disparity can be found in the SCA’s legislative
history and the peculiarities of data storage at the time the SCA was
passed. The Senate observed, in 1986, that most data storage providers
erased users’ information after three months “to ensure system
integrity.” 72 Consequently, it was unlikely that someone would need to
store data with a third party for more than six months. Erasing user data
every three months was likely due to the prohibitive cost of data storage

64

DROPBOX, TERMS, www.dropbox.com/terms#privacy (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
APPLE, ICLOUD TERMS AND CONDITIONS, www.apple.com/legal/icloud/en/terms.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2012).
66
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 tit. II, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848, 1860 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2710 (Westlaw 2012)).
67
SEN. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986).
68
Id. at 3.
69
18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a) (Westlaw 2012).
70
Id. § 2703(b).
71
Id. § 2703(d).
72
SEN. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3.
65
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in 1986. 73 Indeed, a contemporary magazine article noted, “Prices for
hard disks in the 10- or 20-megabyte capacities range from $400 to
$1,500 depending on access time, capacity, and other features.” 74
Compare this to a modern hard disk, which has a storage capacity of 2
terabytes (approximately 100,000 times the capacity of a disk in 1986)
and costs only about $100. 75 Congress is aware that the SCA’s 180-day
provision is problematic: two former U.S. Representatives observed that,
when Congress passed the SCA in 1986,
people assumed that emails remaining on a server were forgotten or
unwanted, and it made some sense to impart a higher level of
protection to newer emails stored for fewer than 180 days. But today,
with the nearly limitless storage capability that online services
provide, the emails we save on the server are often the ones that are
most important to us. 76

Combine the proliferation of cloud-stored data with the ubiquity and
convenience of mobile devices, then add a dash of statutory language
that even former members of Congress acknowledge is woefully out of
date, and a recipe for constitutional disaster is cooked up as millions of
Americans walk around town with personal data in their pockets that is
readily available to law enforcement.
II.

APPLYING THE SCA TO MOBILE DEVICES INCIDENT TO ARREST

Yet another wrinkle in the SCA involves the statute’s application to
a search incident to an arrest. The SCA’s very existence, and Congress’s
desire to place stored communications within the purview of the Fourth
Amendment, suggest that the SCA is the exclusive mechanism for law
enforcement seeking to access stored communications. This would seem
to preclude the use of the common-law doctrine of search incident to
arrest. However, The SCA does not make it entirely clear whether a

73

Scott Shane, Data Storage Could Expand Reach of Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Aug.
14, 2012, 5:50 PM), thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/14/advances-in-data-storage-haveimplications-for-government-surveillance/ (“Not so long ago, even the most aggressive government
surveillance had to be selective: the cost of data storage was too high and the capacity too low to
keep everything.”).
74
Selby Bateman, The Future of Mass Storage, COMPUTE! (Mar. 1986), available at
www.atarimagazines.com/compute/issue70/054_1_THE_FUTURE_OF_MASS_STORAGE.php.
75
AMAZON.COM, www.amazon.com/Western-Digital-Caviar-Desktop-WD20EARX/dp/B00
4VFJ9MK/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
76
Asa Hutchinson & Mickey Edwards, Get a Warrant: Congress Must Act To Protect
Privacy in Digital Age, THE HILL (Oct. 25, 2011), thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/189737-get-a-warrantcongress-must-act-to-protect-privacy-in-digital-age-.
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warrant is always necessary to seize the material within its purview. 77
While “it is not presumed that the common law is changed by statutory
enactment; and statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly
construed,” 78 the Supreme Court “has not simply frozen into
constitutional law those law enforcement practices that existed at the
time of the Fourth Amendment’s passage.” 79 Thus, it could be that the
SCA may override the common law doctrine of search incident to
arrest, 80 placing a Dropbox or iCloud user’s documents outside the reach
of such a search.
In United States v. Robinson, the United States Supreme Court held
that when a person is searched incident to a lawful arrest, “It is the fact of
custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search. . . .” 81 Indeed,
in the case of a lawful custodial arrest, “a full search of the person is not
only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” 82 Cases postRobinson have made fine distinctions as to how far outside the physical
boundaries of a “person” police could go in a search incident to arrest. 83
State courts have recently become the arena for disputes
surrounding police searches of cell phones incident to arrest. 84 The arena
is a mess. In People v. Diaz, the California Supreme Court decided that
police may search the contents of a cell phone incident to a lawful arrest,
although the case dealt solely with text messages stored on the phone. 85
Conversely, the Ohio Supreme Court held in State v. Smith that “because
77

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a) (Westlaw 2012): “A governmental entity may require the
disclosure . . . only pursuant to a warrant . . .” (emphasis added). This language suggests that the
only way in which the government can obtain electronic communications, as defined by the SCA, is
through the warrant procedures specified by the SCA.
78
2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45.12 (7th ed. 2007).
79
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
571 n.33 (1980)).
80
The Supreme Court recognized the existence of such a doctrine at common law in Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
81
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
82
Id. at 235.
83
See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 804-09 (1974) (holding that taking Edwards’s
clothing in order to subject it to a lab analysis was not a search); United States v. Monclavo-Cruz,
662 F.2d 1285, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a purse is within an arrestee’s immediate
control, not an element of her clothing or person); United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 944 (9th
Cir. 1980) (holding that search of suspect’s wallet was permissible as a search of his person incident
to arrest); United States v. Castro, 596 F.2d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a search of
Castro’s wallet was permissible as a search of his person incident to arrest).
84
See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011); Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886 (Ga.
2010); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009).
85
Diaz, 244 P.3d at 505-06.
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a person has a high expectation of privacy in a cell phone’s contents,
police must then obtain a warrant before intruding into the phone’s
contents.” 86 The Court of Appeals of Georgia apparently decided to split
the difference, holding in Hawkins v. State that police did not have
authority to search the entire contents of a cell phone, but only those
contents “that might reasonably contain the object of the search.” 87
Federal courts are similarly divided over whether the contents of cell
phones can be searched incident to a lawful arrest. 88
Justice Werdegar, dissenting in Diaz, posited the very problem that
this Comment addresses: “Never before has it been possible to carry so
much personal or business information in one’s pocket or purse. The
potential impairment to privacy if arrestees’ mobile phones and handheld
computers are treated like clothing or cigarette packages, fully searchable
without probable cause or a warrant, is correspondingly great.” 89 But
Diaz dealt only with the information stored on the phone itself. 90 Justice
Werdegar’s statements are even more applicable to the world of the
Cloud, where the storage capacity is, for all practical purposes, infinite.
A.

THE SCA AS APPLIED TO CLOUD COMPUTING

It is unclear what would happen if a court faced the issue of
applying the SCA to cloud-based services accessible by a mobile device.
There are two issues involved in searching a mobile device incident to
arrest. First, as noted above, is the problem presented by Diaz and Smith:
whether a mobile device can be searched incident to arrest without a
warrant. 91 But another issue, yet unanswered, is whether cloud-stored
documents, specifically, can be searched incident to an arrest on a mobile
device, or any device that connects to the Cloud, and whether the SCA
even applies to cloud-stored documents.
In answering this question, email provides the best available
analogy. An email provider falls within the scope of the SCA’s
86

Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955.
Hawkins, 704 S.E.2d at 892.
88
United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that police had
authority to examine contents of Finley’s phone without a warrant); United States v. Hill, 2011 WL
90130, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (holding that a cellular phone should be considered part of a
person’s clothing and thus subject to a warrantless search incident to arrest). Contra Schlossberg v.
Solesbee, 844 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1169-71 (D. Or. 2012) (adopting Smith and Park’s holding due to the
volume of information a cellular phone can hold); United States v. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9
(N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (holding that a cellular phone should not be considered part of a person’s
clothing “due to the quantity and quality of information that can be stored”).
89
Diaz, 244 P.3d at 514 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
90
Id. at 502-03 (majority opinion).
91
Id. at 503; Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 950-51.
87
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definition of a “remote computing service,” as it provides “to the
public . . . computer storage or processing services by means of an
electronic communications system.” 92 The legal protections, if any, of
email rely on an analogy to postal mail, a field where privacy
expectations are well-established. 93 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces noted, in United States v. Maxwell, that “[email]
transmissions are not unlike other forms of modern communication. We
can draw parallels from these other mediums.” 94 As it stands now, case
law surrounding the search of email is probably the best clue to where
the law is going, and where the law should probably not go, involving a
search of cloud-stored information accessible by a mobile device. If
email is afforded blanket protection under the Fourth Amendment, then
so too should cloud-stored data.
B.

UNITED STATES V. WARSHAK FINDS A RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN EMAIL

The judiciary has been slow to recognize that electronic information
should be afforded the same Fourth Amendment protections as other
types of “real-world” data. 95 Recently, the Sixth Circuit recognized a
Fourth Amendment right to the privacy in email stored with an Internet
Service Provider (ISP) in United States v. Warshak. 96 Steven Warshak
was accused of mail and bank fraud for operating a business that
distributed herbal supplements for male sexual enhancement. 97 As part
of its investigation, the United States procured 27,000 of Warshak’s
private emails using an administrative subpoena, which was permitted by
the SCA. 98 Warshak sought to suppress these emails as the result of an
illegal search. 99 The Sixth Circuit found that, while Warshak did have a
Fourth Amendment right to privacy in the emails, because the
government relied on the SCA in good faith, Warshak’s conviction
should not be reversed. 100 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit held, “to the

92

18 U.S.C.A. § 2711(2) (Westlaw 2012).
See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, ACLU of Ohio Foundation,
Inc., American Civil Liberties Union, & Center for Democracy & Technology Supporting the
Appellee & Urging Affirmance at 4, United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (2010) (No. 06-4092),
available at www.eff.org/files/filenode/warshak_v_usa/warshak_amicus.pdf.
94
United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
95
See id. at 418 (holding that the sender of an email message has a right to the privacy of its
contents).
96
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
97
Id. at 274.
98
Id. at 282.
99
Id. at 281.
100
Id. at 282.
93
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extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such
emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.” 101
Even though the Warshak court affirmed the trial court’s judgment
by holding that the government relied in good faith on the SCA’s
constitutionality, the court set a precedent for future email privacy cases
in the Sixth Circuit. 102 What is most important about Warshak is its
reasoning. Applying the Katz test, the court found that Warshak did have
a subjective expectation of privacy in his emails: “Given the often
sensitive and sometimes damning substance of his emails, we think it
highly unlikely that Warshak expected them to be made public, for
people seldom unfurl their dirty laundry in plain view.” 103
The court also found, under the second prong of Katz, that this was
a privacy expectation society recognized as reasonable. 104 The Katz
Court, forty-three years earlier, based its decision in part on “the vital
role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.” 105 The Warshak court applied this same criterion to
email, concluding that:
Since the advent of email, the telephone call and the letter have waned
in importance, and an explosion of Internet-based communication has
taken place. People are now able to send sensitive and intimate
information, instantaneously, to friends, family, and colleagues half a
world away. Lovers exchange sweet nothings, and businessmen swap
ambitious plans, all with the click of a mouse button. Commerce has
also taken hold in email. Online purchases are often documented in
email accounts, and email is frequently used to remind patients and
clients of imminent appointments. In short, “account” is an apt word
for the conglomeration of stored messages that comprises an email
account, as it provides an account of its owner’s life. By obtaining
access to someone’s email, government agents gain the ability to peer
106
deeply into his activities.

Warshak’s use of Katz’s language about the expanded role of
telephones in communication suggests that a “ubiquity check” is folded
into the second prong of the test. The fact that email in 2010 was as
common a medium of communication as the telephone in 1967 bolsters
the reasonableness of society’s privacy expectation in email.

101

Id. at 288.
Id. at 292.
103
Id. at 284 (footnote omitted).
104
Id. at 285-86.
105
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
106
Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284.
102
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Consequently, “[a]s some forms of communication begin to diminish, the
Fourth Amendment must recognize and protect nascent ones that
arise.” 107 Thus, the more useful and potentially indispensable a
technology becomes to personal communication, commercial
communication, or both, the more it is afforded Fourth Amendment
protection. 108
If Warshak were merely a vanilla case of a warrantless search under
the Fourth Amendment, that would be the end of it; “[t]he government
may not compel a commercial [Internet Service Provider] to turn over
the contents of a subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant
based on probable cause.” 109 But the Sixth Circuit had to face the SCA,
which gave the government the authority (the government thought) to
obtain Warshak’s emails. 110 Although the Sixth Circuit found that
Warshak had an expectation of privacy in his email, that expectation was
irrelevant in the face of the government’s good-faith reliance on the
SCA, even though the Court found the SCA unconstitutional. 111
Cloud computing, though, might be a different animal altogether.
There are easy analogies to be made (and Warshak makes them in
coming to its conclusion 112 ) between email and traditional postal mail.
Postal mail has a long and storied history of use, making it something
that courts understand. 113 Email, like regular mail, is a transmission
from one person to another. 114 The sender intends for only one person,
the recipient, to ever read that transmission. 115 A cloud storage system,
on the other hand, is more like a bank deposit box: its contents, though

107

Id. at 286.
“Wait a minute,” the reader might say at this point, “what about the Court’s opinion in
Kyllo v. United States? Wasn’t there an expectation of privacy there because a thermal imaging gun
was not in common use? Doesn’t ubiquity cut both ways, resulting in inconsistent application?”
This Comment, as well as the SCA, deals only with communications and not intrusive physical
searches per se. Thermal imaging guns are hardly “indispensable” to communication and do not
play a vital role in private communication. Moreover, the Court’s opinion in Kyllo had much more
to do with the imaging gun’s invasion of the home than with its invasion of privacy in general. See
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37-41 (2001).
109
Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.
110
Id. at 282.
111
Id. at 290.
112
See id. at 285-86 (“Letters and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in
which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy.” (quoting Jacobsen v. United
States, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984))).
113
Brief for Professors of Electronic Privacy Law & Internet Law as Amici Curiae Supporting
the Appellee & Urging Affirmance at 13, United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (2010) (No. 064092), available at www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/warshak_v_usa/amicus_final_law
_profs.pdf.
114
Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285.
115
United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
108
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accessible by a third party, are intended to be viewed only by the owner
of the deposit box. 116 Using Dropbox or iCloud to save a document does
not entail the intent to transmit that document’s contents from one person
to another, but rather to store that document in a safe place for later
retrieval by the person who put it there originally. Even under this
premise, such a document still has Fourth Amendment protection. 117
C.

THE UNCERTAIN DEFINITION OF “ELECTRONIC STORAGE”

Even though the Fourth Amendment and its associated case law
should circumscribe the boundaries of cloud-storage searches, statutes
like the SCA complicate an already complicated area of the law. The
SCA carves out exceptions for certain types of searches but not others. 118
In examining the propriety of searching cloud-stored files on a mobile
device without a warrant, a threshold issue is whether these types of data
fall within one of these exceptions.
The SCA defines “electronic storage” both as “any temporary,
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to
the electronic transmission thereof” and “any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of
backup protection of such communication.” 119 It is this second clause of
the SCA’s definition of electronic storage that causes trouble, because
the language of the statute may actually exempt some types of cloudstored data from protection.
In Theofel v. Farey-Jones, the Ninth Circuit had to decide whether
email messages stored on an ISP’s remote email server until delivery
were in “electronic storage” in light of case law holding that undelivered

116

See Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-Mail,
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 165-66 (2008) (“[O]ne does not engage the third party because one
wants the intermediary to have access; that access is a required means of effectuating the customer’s
interests. The same can be said of the user of a storage locker, a rental property, or a safe deposit
box. The customer’s interest in making use of the service necessitates the involvement of the third
party. Of course, the same may be said of the ISP customer; she engages with the ISP out of the
desire to use its intermediary services.”). Warshak cites to this article in order to demonstrate that
stored email is akin not only to a postal letter, but also to any other thing entrusted to a third party for
delivery or storage. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.
117
See Brief for Professors of Electronic Privacy Law & Internet Law as Amici Curiae
Supporting the Appellee & Urging Affirmance, supra note 113, at 13-14 (“[W]hen someone
maintains personal property on a third party’s premises, she retains an expectation of privacy in it, so
long as the property is secured against others’ access and the third party’s right of access to the
premises is limited.”).
118
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (Westlaw 2012) and its divergent treatment of information that is
newer or older than 180 days. The SCA also narrowly circumscribes what falls within its scope. See
generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 (Westlaw 2012).
119
18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(17) (Westlaw 2012).
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emails were in “temporary, intermediate storage.” 120 Finding that the
emails were “stored ‘by an electronic communication service’ within the
meaning of” the SCA, 121 the Ninth Circuit determined that the second
clause of the definition of electronic storage—that data stored by an
electronic communication service be stored “for purposes of backup
protection”—applies to data only if it is being stored for the purpose of
being backed up. 122 Furthermore, this intent to store data for backup
protection must be the motivating reason for storage and not just another
possible reason for storage; in order to fall within the scope of the SCA,
“the mere fact that a copy could serve as a backup does not mean it is
stored for that purpose.” 123
In the Ninth Circuit’s view, a “backup” consists of “storing a
message on an ISP’s server after delivery [in order] to provide a second
copy of the message in the event that the user needs to download it
again—if, for example, the message is accidentally erased from the
user’s own computer.” 124 A “backup” under the SCA thus requires both
temporary storage data coupled with an intent to store those data in case
a user (or, as the court concedes, the ISP) needs to access it again. 125 A
copy of data stored for any other reason is, conceivably, not protected. 126
In an aside that was not applicable in Theofel, but could be
applicable to future cloud computing cases, the Theofel court considered
the possibility that “[a] remote computing service might be the only
place a user stores his messages; in that case, the messages are not stored
for backup purposes.” 127 This musing describes the cloud computing
dilemma perfectly. People use cloud services for a variety of reasons,
including, but not limited to, backing up information. 128 A person could
also store information in the Cloud for ease of access from multiple
devices. 129 Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the SCA, such a
use of the Cloud would not fall within the scope of the SCA, because the
data were not stored solely for “backup purposes.”

120

Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.
122
Id. at 1076.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1075.
125
Id.
126
See id. at 1076 (“[T]he lifespan of a backup is necessarily tied to that of the underlying
message. Where the underlying message has expired in the normal course, any copy is no longer
performing any backup function. An ISP that kept permanent copies of temporary messages could
not fairly be described as ‘backing up’ those messages.”).
127
Id. at 1077.
128
Why Is Online Storage Becoming So Popular?, supra note 60.
129
Id.
121
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When it comes to cloud computing, a file located on the remote
servers of companies such as Dropbox is “not stored for backup
purposes,” but is in fact constantly updated as the Dropbox software,
installed on a user’s computer or smart phone, monitors the local file for
changes and updates the server’s copy as necessary. 130 Herein lies the
problem: in the Ninth Circuit, any non-backup data stored with a remote
computing service may very well fall outside the statute’s scope. Given
that Congress’s intention in crafting the SCA was to bring certainty to a
new, uncertain area of technology, 131 it is woefully ironic that the
statute’s own language puts the very data it sought to protect out of its
reach.
The court’s aside in Theofel—that a user could potentially store all
of his or her data on a remote computer, meaning that it is not backed
up 132 —has started to hit home. United States v. Weaver was a childpornography prosecution in which the government subpoenaed the
defendant’s email from Microsoft, the operator of the Hotmail email
service, pursuant to the less-stringent SCA requirement. 133 The question
for the court was, as in Theofel, whether the emails in question were in
“electronic storage” under the SCA: “If the emails the Government
requested here are in electronic storage, Microsoft need not produce
them without a warrant, but if they are held or maintained solely to
provide the customer storage or computer processing services, Microsoft
must comply with the Government’s subpoena.” 134
In Weaver, however, the defendant did not download the emails to
his computer; instead, he viewed them from Hotmail’s web interface. 135
Therefore, the copy held by Hotmail was not merely a backup copy; it
was the only copy, and in that case, “Microsoft [was] not storing [his]
opened messages for backup purposes. Instead, Microsoft [was]
maintaining the messages ‘solely for the purpose of providing storage or
computer processing services to such subscriber or customer.’” 136 The
Weaver court nevertheless looked to the legislative history of the SCA
and concluded that “if the Stored Communications Act drafters intended
emails a user leaves on an email service for re-access at a later date to be

130

Idilio Drago et al., Inside Dropbox: Understanding Personal Cloud Storage Services 3,
International Measurement Conference (2012), www.tlc-networks.polito.it/oldsite/mellia/papers/
DropboxImc12.pdf.
131
SEN. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986).
132
Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1077.
133
United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 769-70 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
134
Id.
135
Id. at 772.
136
Id.
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covered by section 2702(a)(2), they also must have intended them to be
covered by the Government’s trial subpoena power.” 137
III. SOLUTIONS: SEEKING CERTAINTY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
As Judge Kozinski pointed out in United States v. Comprehensive
Drug Testing, Inc. (known popularly as the BALCO case), “It’s no
answer to suggest . . . that people can avoid these hazards by not storing
their data electronically.” 138 The Cloud is here to stay, and with it must
come strong, clear privacy protections for cloud-stored data.
Consider the situation in which Susie Citizen is pulled over by the
city police for a traffic violation. Officer Friendly looks up Susie’s name
on his police computer and finds that she has a valid, outstanding arrest
warrant because she failed to show up in court pursuant to a
misdemeanor littering citation. Officer Friendly performs a custodial
arrest of Susie and finds her iPhone in her pocket. Because current law
permits him to examine the contents of containers on her person, he
slides the virtual slider to get to the phone’s home screen.
Officer Friendly opens up the Pages application, a word processor.
This application’s documents are stored in Apple’s iCloud, not on the
phone. The first document that appears is a list of Susie’s crack cocaine
clients and their outstanding balances with Susie. At a motion to
suppress this evidence, Susie argues that she had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of her iPhone, and none of the case
law deals with information obtained by police that was not stored on the
phone.
In the Ninth Circuit, a document stored on a cloud service may or
may not be searchable under the SCA, depending on the user’s intent in
placing the document in the Cloud in the first place. Different
interpretations of the same statute do not make for efficient law
enforcement, especially for police in the field, who must make splitsecond decisions. Failing to document relevant evidence might lead to
its destruction by the suspect before a warrant can be obtained;
examining evidence that is protected by the Fourth Amendment could
lead to the exclusion of relevant evidence. 139 Because the law is in flux,
it is hard for the “cop on the beat” to know what to do. “Clear rules
announce ex ante what the police can and cannot do; so long as the

137

Id. at 773. It is difficult to say, however, what Congress intended with regard to modern
email storage in 1986, as modern email systems did not exist.
138
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (per curiam).
139
See discussion of the exclusionary rule, supra, note 23 and accompanying text.
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police comply with the clear rules, the police will know that the evidence
cannot be excluded.” 140 Requiring police to go through a complex
flowchart of possible options (e.g., whether a document has been stored
for longer than 180 days or even if such a document is electronically
stored) does no one—police or civilians—any good. There must be a
clear set of rules that, “in most instances, makes it possible to reach a
correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is
justified in the interest of law enforcement.” 141
In terms of policies that police can follow, the solutions will be
either legislative or judicial. As the SCA is a federal law, Congress
would have to address the statute’s deficiencies. Alternatively, courts
could avoid the SCA altogether and opt for an approach based on Katz’s
two-prong test. 142 Or courts could reasonably conclude that a cell phone
with cloud accessibility is too much like a computer to permit police to
search it without a warrant; such a request is not outrageous, as the Ohio
Supreme Court reached that conclusion with phones that were not
connected to the Internet. 143 Any resultant policy will have to be simple
and straightforward.
A.

AMENDING THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT

As this Comment is being written, legal organizations like the
ACLU, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and the Digital Due
Process Coalition are hard at work crafting legislation to update the
SCA. 144 In May 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011. 145 The bill
would have eliminated the SCA’s peculiar 180-day provision and would
have mandated that the contents of stored communications be obtained
pursuant to a probable-cause warrant. 146 However, the proposed
legislation would have permitted an administrative subpoena to be used
to obtain identification information, such as the subscriber’s name,
address, or telephone number. 147

140

Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 528

(2007).
141

Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
143
“Although cell phones cannot be equated with laptop computers, their ability to store large
amounts of private data gives their users a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of
privacy in the information they contain.” State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009).
144
DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION (Oct. 14, 2012), digitaldueprocess.org.
145
Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act, S. 1011, 112th Cong. (2011).
146
Id. § 3.
147
Id.
142

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/4

20

Wilson: Castle in the Cloud

2013]

Castle in the Cloud

281

In introducing the bill, Senator Leahy noted that, “[u]nder the
current law, a single e-mail could be subject to as many a four different
levels of privacy protections, depending upon where it is stored and
when it was sent.” 148 This bill, however, does not clarify the meanings
of phrases like “electronic storage.” 149 It also would permit exceptions
to disclosure, including delayed notification (a search-warrant technique
in which the person whose data are the subject of the search is notified of
the search only after it has taken place). 150
Professor Orin S. Kerr has expressed a dislike for the judicial
approach to crafting Fourth Amendment protection, noting that statutes
have been historically more important in crafting Fourth Amendment
policy than case law. 151 For example, he observes that the history of
wiretapping law, from Olmstead to Katz, “has remained a primarily
statutory field governed by statutory commands. Indeed, it turns out that
very few cases in the history of wiretapping law have ruled that a
wiretapping practice violated the Fourth Amendment.” 152 Professor Kerr
makes much of Chief Justice Taft’s helpful suggestion to Congress at the
end of Olmstead:
Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by
making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal
criminal trials, by direct legislation and thus depart from the common
law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt such a policy by
attributing an enlarged and unusual meaning to the Fourth
Amendment. 153

After Olmstead, Congress took Chief Justice Taft’s advice and
passed the first federal wiretapping law in 1934. 154 Even post-Katz,
Congress has “taken the lead” in creating statutory privacy rights more
protective than those offered by the Fourth Amendment. 155
The legislative approach would be ideal, as the legislature is in a
position to create a rule governing a situation before it happens, while
courts are necessarily reactive, responding only to a putative violation
148

157 CONG. REC. S3054-01 (daily ed. May 17, 2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
Nowhere within S. 1011 is there an updated or clearer definition of “electronic storage,”
leaving open the problem from Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). Where a
document not stored specifically for backup purposes might not be protected by the SCA.
150
Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act, S. 1011 § 4.
151
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 839 (2004).
152
Id.
153
Id. at 845 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928)).
154
Id.
155
Id. at 855.
149
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that has already happened. 156 Well-crafted legislation could resolve the
SCA’s problems, including the 180-day provision, as well as the
ambiguity over what “electronic storage” is. Such legislation would
recognize that data are placed in electronic storage because we wish to
keep them safe. Legislative rules, and not a myriad of different judicial
opinions, would ostensibly provide the stability that police need in order
to operate.
Representative Zoe Lofgren of California recently introduced the
ECPA 2.0 Act of 2012 into the House of Representatives. The Act
would update the SCA by eliminating the 180-day distinction, requiring
law enforcement to obtain a warrant for all electronically stored data. 157
Representative Lofgren’s attempt to update the SCA is laudable, but its
detractors are powerful. Senator Leahy’s 2011 measure faced opposition
from such groups as the National District Attorneys’ Association and the
National Sheriffs’ Association. 158 The United States Department of
Justice opposed changes to the ECPA on the ground that “changes could
adversely affect the critical goal of protecting public safety and the
national security of the United States.” 159
B.

APPLYING KATZ AND TRADITIONAL SEARCH-INCIDENT-TO-ARREST
CASE LAW

Legislation may not be forthcoming, or the resultant legislation
could make things worse. Cloud-stored documents must be protected
somehow, and in a scenario in which legislation is nonexistent, or fails to
recognize a constitutional privacy right in cloud-stored data, the judiciary
would have to provide the protection.
In the interplay between the Supreme Court and Congress, there is a
period where the law is either unclear or undesirable; for example, postOlmstead, there was a six-year period in which law enforcement could
wiretap with abandon before Congress passed the first wiretapping
laws. 160 Post-Warshak, the SCA is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it
purports to allow officials to obtain email without a warrant, but only in

156

Id. at 868.
ECPA 2.0 Act, H.R. 6529, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2012).
158
Declan McCullagh, Senate Delays Netflix, E-mail Privacy Fix After Cops Protest, CNET
(Sept. 20, 2012, 11:07 AM), news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57517033-38/senate-delays-netflix-email-privacy-fix-after-cops-protest/.
159
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on Protecting
Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2011)
(statement of James A. Baker, Associate Deputy Attorney General).
160
Kerr, supra note 151, at 845.
157
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the Sixth Circuit. 161 Justice Alito, concurring in United States v. Jones,
observed that, in the absence of legislation, “the best that [the Court] can
do” is apply existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in determining
when there has been a search. 162 With the SCA already in existence, it is
hard to say that there is no legislation governing the situation at issue;
however, the SCA’s deficiencies—especially where SCA provisions
contradict the Fourth Amendment—are perhaps worse than having no
legislation at all.
In the absence of legislation, Katz provides an adequate test for
determining a person’s privacy expectations in a new technology. The
Warshak court implied that Katz includes a “future-proof” mechanism. 163
When deciding whether a privacy right in a new technology is a right
that society is prepared to recognize as a reasonable, courts should
examine “the vital role that the [new technology] has come to play in
private communication.” 164 In this way, complex new technology can be
afforded Fourth Amendment protection by answering two simple
questions: Did this person believe his or her communication transmitted
by this technology was private? Does society think that is a reasonable
belief?
There are benefits to applying Katz directly. The Katz test has been
with us for more than forty years, meaning that police departments are
familiar with it. 165 Katz alleviates the need for constant legislative
updates, as the second prong—the objective expectation of privacy—
automatically changes as society changes. Presumably, as a particular
communications technology becomes more useful and ubiquitous,
society’s reliance on it increases, and so too does society’s reasonable
expectation that communications will remain private. 166 Under Katz,
Officer Friendly’s warrantless search was likely impermissible, as there
was no exigency and society recognizes that Susie’s expectation of
privacy in storing her documents on Apple’s iCloud is reasonable.

161

United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
163
See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“As some forms of communication begin to
diminish, the Fourth Amendment must recognize and protect nascent ones that arise.”).
164
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). Note that the inquiry here is focused on
“communication” and not merely “storage” or “presence.” Applying Katz’s future-proofing to Diaz
and Smith, where the information physically resided on the mobile device, is another topic, for
another day.
165
Kerr, supra note 140, at 526-27.
166
Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286.
162
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Katz also has its problems, not the least of which is its inconsistent
application. 167 Even though the Katz Court professed to have abandoned
the old property-based notion of privacy from Olmstead, the Supreme
Court has continued to invoke property law in Fourth Amendment cases
in determining whether a search was unreasonable. 168 An officer relying
on Katz might have no way of knowing, before conducting her or his
search, whether the search was constitutional.
However, a court can sidestep the traditional search-incident-toarrest doctrine altogether. This is why the various cell phone cases came
to different results. 169 For every Smith (in which the Ohio Supreme
Court said a warrant was required to search the contents of a phone),
there is a Finley (in which the Fifth Circuit upheld the characterization of
a cell phone as a searchable container found on the arrestee’s person). 170
In cases where courts have decided that police can rifle through a cell
phone’s contents, it is the phone’s location, rather than its character, that
has been the benchmark. 171 That is, because Officer Friendly found the
phone on Susie’s person, prior case law suggests that every bit of data
accessible by the phone, irrespective of its actual location, is fair game
for a search. 172

167

Professor Kerr observes, “Katz is a Rorschach test. Its vague language can support a
narrow or broad reading equally well.” Kerr, supra note 151, at 822.
168
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects
people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear that
the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into
any given enclosure.”). Contra Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (use of a thermal
imaging device was a search because it was a “physical invasion of the structure of the home”);
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012) (holding that Katz did not overrule the
common-law doctrine of trespass as applied to rendering a search reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment). See generally Daniel Zamani, There’s an Amendment for That: A Comprehensive
Application of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence to Smart Phones, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 169,
174-75 (2010).
169
See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505-06 (Cal. 2011) (holding that a cell phone was
searchable like any other container on suspect’s person); Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886, 891-92
(Ga. 2010) (holding that, even though a cell phone is like a container, that characterization does not
give police carte blanche to examine all the files on the device, but it allows police to examine some
files); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (holding that a cell phone was not akin to
containers from prior case law and could not be searched without a warrant).
170
State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009). Contra United States v. Finley, 477
F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007).
171
See, e.g., Finley, 477 F.3d at 260 (cell phone found on a suspect’s person is akin to a
container found on a suspect’s person).
172
Diaz, 244 P.3d at 509 (“These arguments [that the court should distinguish between the
phone and its contents] are inconsistent with the high court’s decisions. Those decisions hold that
the loss of privacy upon arrest extends beyond the arrestee’s body to include ‘personal property . . .
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee’ at the time of arrest.”).
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SIDESTEPPING ROBINSON: “TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY” AND
UNDERSTANDING THAT A PHONE IS NOT A WALLET

Other than seeking legislative change, some scholars advocate an
approach that might satisfy even a Finley-type court. Professor Kerr has
suggested a principle of “technology neutrality,” under which “the
degree of privacy the Fourth Amendment extends to the Internet should
try to match the degree of privacy protection that the Fourth Amendment
provides in the physical world.” 173 A typical search-and-seizure
situation depends on the physical limits of an object. “A search incident
to arrest includes the physically grabbable area near the arrestee, but
generally no further. A search warrant must describe the physical place
to be searched with particularity, generally approving searches the
physical scale of a single home or property but rarely more.” 174
On the Internet, however, “electronic data has no inherent
limitations on how much can exist, where it can be located, and where it
can be stored.” 175 This disconnect gives rise to a Fourth Amendment
problem in terms of the Cloud, where there are no physical limitations.
Searching cloud-stored documents on a mobile device can be
accomplished in minutes and not the weeks it would take to search an
equivalent amount of documents in the physical world. 176 Even though
the phone is “physically grabbable,” the data may not be—indeed, it is
likely that the data are located in a different jurisdiction. 177
Analogizing a phone to a wallet is not the result of a
misunderstanding about whether a phone is a wallet, but rather the result
of jurisprudence that has failed to keep up with the types of technologies
that can transform a wallet-sized object into a file-cabinet-type object.
Courts that look at the size and location of a mobile device (e.g., whether
it is on the person, in a purse, or in the car seat next to the suspect) focus
173

Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (2010); see also ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, supra note 15, at 24 (statement of David Schellhase, Executive Vice President and
General Counsel, Salesforce.com).
174
Kerr, supra note 173, at 1014.
175
Id.
176
Police can use devices such as the Cellebrite UFED, the subject of an ACLU lawsuit in
Michigan, to extract the entire contents of a cell phone within minutes. ACLU Concerned over
Michigan State Police Extracting Data from Cellphones, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2011, 4:50 PM),
latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/04/aclu-concerned-over-michigan-state-policeextracting-phone-data.html.
177
ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 15, at
107 (written statement of Thomas B. Hurbanek, Senior Investigator, New York State Police
Computer Crime Unit).
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too much on what Professor Kerr calls the “inside/outside distinction,”
which defines the parameters of a Fourth Amendment search in terms of
what a human being can generally see with his or her eyes:
Outside spaces are open to visual observation. The officer can use the
surveillance tool of his eyes to see what is there. In contrast, closed
spaces are closed from visual observation; the officer cannot see what
is inside the enclosure. To see what is behind the barrier, the officer
needs to break into the house, jimmy open the car trunk, unseal the
letter, or otherwise break through the physical barrier that blocks his
eyes from being able to see evidence inside. 178

The Internet has rendered this definition of a “search” as
“break[ing] through the physical barrier” meaningless. 179 Technology
neutrality does not look at the physical character of the device storing the
information, but rather creates a blanket protection for “content,” that is,
the substantive information that a person seeks to protect. 180
Not everyone believes in crafting a new rule for “electronic
containers.” Byron Kish, writing in Catholic University Law Review,
argues that a cellular phone is a container because it “can physically hold
objects, for example, in a hidden compartment” and also because it
“contains electronic information that can be reproduced in physical
form.” 181 This view, however, also falls victim to the problems
associated with creating analogies. A mobile device could be searched
for hidden compartments containing tangible, real-world objects (like a
scrap of paper), but that would not affect the files on the device or stored
in the Cloud, and the cloud-stored information would be intact. As for
reproduction in physical form, documents and photographs could be
downloaded from the device and printed, but this would make little
sense, as people use the Cloud to obviate the need for maintaining
physical copies of documents. 182
The Supreme Court, despite Judge Kozinski’s pessimism, seems
prepared to recognize that new technology requires new rules. The two
concurrences in the recent United States v. Jones decision suggest as
much: Justice Sotomayor noted that “the same technological advances
that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also

178

Kerr, supra note 173, at 1011.
Id. at 1017-18.
180
Id. at 1020.
181
Byron Kish, Cellphone Searches: Works Like a Computer, Protected Like a Pager?, 60
CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 469 (2011).
182
Paul Mah, Three Benefits of Saving Files in the Cloud, IT BUSINESS EDGE (Nov. 28,
2012), www.itbusinessedge.com/blogs/smb-tech/three-benefits-of-saving-files-in-the-cloud.html.
179
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affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy
expectations.” 183 Justice Alito, concurring separately, agreed with the
ultimate outcome but doubted the utility of the majority’s property-based
approach, especially since the search method employed—a GPS tracking
device—was so far removed from anything known at common law. 184
Justice Alito’s offhand comment about a tiny constable or the very
large coach, in addition to being entertaining, is also instructive. 185 The
analogies used in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence deal with size,
location, or other attributes of the physical world and not enough with
the nature or use of the thing searched. 186 Cloud-stored documents can,
and should, be afforded constitutional protection from warrantless
searches under a theory that the police could not search a warehouse or a
closed file cabinet without a warrant.
Notwithstanding cases like Finley, courts appear to be prepared to
acknowledge the differences between phones and cigarette packs, pagers,
or footlockers. As the federal district court in Oregon recently observed,
the storage capability of an electronic device is not limited by physical
size as a container is. In order to carry the same amount of personal
information contained in many of today’s electronic devices in a
container, a citizen would have to travel with one or more large
suitcases, if not file cabinets. 187

Attaching an Internet connection to this container expands the
capacity by many orders of magnitude to the point where the analogy
breaks down solely on a common-sense level. Quite simply, “[a]n
analogy between a computer and a container oversimplifies a complex
area of Fourth Amendment doctrine and ignores the realities of massive
modern computer storage.” 188

183

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
185
Id. at 958 n.3 (responding to the majority’s assertion that common law could have
contemplated round-the-clock vehicle surveillance by noting, “The Court suggests that something
like this might have occurred in 1791, but this would have required either a gigantic coach, a very
tiny constable, or both—not to mention a constable with incredible fortitude and patience.”).
186
See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (“Given their unique nature as
multifunctional tools, cell phones defy easy categorization. On one hand, they contain digital address
books very much akin to traditional address books carried on the person, which are entitled to a
lower expectation of privacy in a search incident to an arrest. On the other hand, they have the ability
to transmit large amounts of data in various forms, likening them to laptop computers, which are
entitled to a higher expectation of privacy.”).
187
Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (D. Or. 2012).
188
Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 75, 110 (1994).
184
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Any protection of a mobile device’s cloud-stored documents,
however, would have to extend protection to documents or files stored on
the phone itself. It “would simply be an unworkable and unreasonable
rule” to require the police to ascertain the nature of a mobile device
before deciding to search its contents. 189 Police in the field are charged
with making split-second evidentiary decisions and cannot engage in an
analysis of what type of device they are dealing with. 190
In United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit cautioned: “Authorization to search some computer files therefore
automatically becomes authorization to search all files in the same subdirectory, and all files in an enveloping directory, a neighboring hard
drive, a nearby computer or nearby storage media.” 191 Thus, any rule
governing mobile devices must, of necessity, encompass all mobile
devices, including smart phones like the iPhone and the Android phone,
or the “dumb” cell phone of the recent past. Treating all mobile devices
like a computer would more than fulfill the necessity for a clear rule.
Once in an officer’s possession, the necessity for the search incident to
arrest—the fear of evidence destruction before a warrant can be
obtained 192 —disappears, and a “neutral and detached magistrate” 193 can
decide, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, whether the phone should be
searched.
This does not mean that the police must “avert their eyes” when
presented with a phone upon which there may be an open and obvious
text message indicating criminal activity. 194 The “plain view” doctrine
can be, and has been, applied to searches of computers. 195 In United
States v. Carey, police acting pursuant to a warrant to search for evidence

189

United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“A police officer’s determination as
to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad
hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance
into an analysis of each step in the search.”).
191
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (per curiam).
192
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234.
193
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
194
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489-90 (1971). The “plain view” doctrine has
never required the police to avoid using their senses; it has merely reinforced that police may not go
on treasure hunts when faced with the prospect of juicy evidence.
195
United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521-22 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that warrant
authorizing police to search suspect’s computer for evidence of harassment and making criminal
threats “impliedly authorized” police to open every file on the computer, at least to determine
“whether the file fell within the scope of the warrant’s authorization,” meaning “any child
pornography viewed on the computer or electronic media may be seized under the plain-view
doctrine”); see also James Saylor, Note, Computers as Castles: Preventing the Plain View Doctrine
from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital Searches, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2809 (2011).
190
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of drug trafficking instead found child pornography on Carey’s
computer. 196 A police search of the “closed files,” the court held, was
not constitutional because the closed files (though not the first open file
that initiated the search) were not in plain view. 197 If we must make
analogies, then let us conclude that a smart phone is more like a
computer than a pack of cigarettes. A pack of cigarettes cannot contain
the contents of a diary without sacrificing its size. An iPhone, on the
other hand, could contain the collected works of Shakespeare.
CONCLUSION
Convenient technologies are not flashes in the pan. “Electronic
storage and transmission of data is no longer a peculiarity or a luxury of
the very rich; it’s a way of life.” 198 Convenience breeds use, and with
use, necessity. The telegraph, telephone, email, and cell phone have all
had their time as essential to individual lives and worldwide
communications. Increasingly, even voice communication on cell
phones has taken a backseat to data transfers. 199 The Cloud takes
communication technology to the next level. It enables us to take our
“papers” with us wherever we go, but in a way that is nothing like a
briefcase. Quite literally, a person with a mobile device and cloud
storage can access every document she or her has ever written and every
photo she or he has ever taken, from anywhere in the world so long as
there is an Internet connection. The limitations of physical space no
longer apply. For example, I could save this Comment to Dropbox and
edit it on my iPhone from a Maui beach if necessary. 200 It appears,
however, that a combination of uncertain jurisprudence and antiquated
statutes have conspired to grant cloud-stored documents less protection
than the Fourth Amendment demands.
The SCA, though well intentioned, may pave the road to the demise
of privacy as electronically stored and transmitted communication
becomes ever more important. The SCA needs to be amended, and wellcrafted legislation could solve the problems of ambiguity and the
questionable 180-day requirement that the Sixth Circuit found
unconstitutional. Without a functioning SCA, however, there must be
196

United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1273.
198
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (per curiam).
199
Jenna Wortham, Cellphones Now Used More for Data Than for Calls, N.Y. TIMES, May
14, 2010, at B1, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/technology/personaltech/14talk.html.
200
Sadly, the University would not provide travel expenses to permit me to prove that this
was true.
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some way to determine whether cloud-stored information is
constitutionally protected. And the Cloud is only one new technology
that is changing how people live and work, while simultaneously
creating headaches for law enforcement, which is forced to operate under
rules based on eighteenth-century modes of living. Technology that
cannot even be conceived of yet will be subject to ossified regulation that
addresses a very narrow, and currently arbitrary, aspect of the data:
whether they were stored for more than 180 days.
In the absence of legislation, the judiciary must intervene and
determine that mobile devices, and the data stored upon them or
accessible by them, are well outside the universe of “closed containers”
contemplated by the Supreme Court of yesteryear. Accordingly, a
device’s contents, including its cloud-accessible documents, must be
stored until a warrant is obtained. Such an application would necessarily
lead to a new understanding of technology’s interplay with the Fourth
Amendment. This understanding is crucial to the future of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, given how strained technology privacy
jurisprudence has become under the weight of obsolete analogies that
ignore new technology’s obvious, intrinsic qualities and instead classify
it according to what James Madison was familiar with.
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